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Abstract 
Dominant conceptions of the history of the British Empire assert that empire was a coherent 
phenomenon and maintain the coherence of their subject matter by treating empire as a 
metaphor for broader conceptions of power. Influential histories of empire since the 1950s do 
not present empire as a phenomenon in its own right, and collapse into other totalising meta-
concepts such as global capitalism or western cultural dominance. Challenging such 
approaches, this article argues for the return of an essentially political definition of empire 
with sovereignty at its core, which recognises that British assertions of sovereignty were 
incoherent, multiple, and mutually incompatible with one another. Tracing the history of 
conflict between different idioms of sovereign authority, it shows how the British empire was 
defined by a series of mutually self-contradictory ideas about what it was. It suggests that a 
recognition of the incoherence of imperial sovereignty offers new, more nuanced, readings of 
central concerns in the literature such as imperial violence and the economics of empire. 
 
 
As the British empire was an historic growth, corresponding to no principle, the application 
of any principle whatever to it would at once torpedo it. 
Israel Zangwill, Principle of Nationalities, 1917, 34 
 
I 
The sun has risen once again on the British empire. Empire is intractably entangled with 
present-day concerns. Topics as seemingly diverse as the waxing and waning of American 
hyper-power, global poverty, gender and racial inequality, the politics of terrorism, the 
constitutional integrity of the United Kingdom, Brexit, even the architecture of Oxford 
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University are connected to and connected by readings of the history of empire.1 
Undergirding the apparent contemporary relevance of empire, from the political right to left, 
Niall Ferguson to Seaumus Milne, is the premise that the British empire was a coherent 
phenomenon: a singular structure that extended throughout the globe and endured through 
time with after-effects which last until now.  In practice imagining empire as a unified 
phenomenon is only possible by turning the concept into a metaphor, a synonym for 
something else such as modernity, globalisation, capitalism or the cultural dominance of 
Europeans. Empire has lost any sense of being a phenomenon in its own right. It ends up 
being collapsed into some other totalising meta-concept, become a diffuse term for global 
economic or cultural power. The price we pay for empire’s artificial coherence is an idea that 
floats freely from any kind of empirical specificity, which has little analytical rigour, and has 
content and borders that are impossible to delineate. The presumption of empire’s unity is 
bad history. It leads to misleading parallels in the present and obstructs contemporary 
understandings of the causes of poverty, inequality and violence.  
 
In place of abstract unverifiable meta-histories, this article argues for return to the language 
which contemporaries used to understand empire. ‘Empire’, we argue, was a political 
concept: it described, and should be used by scholars to describe, the ways first Englishmen 
then Britons asserted sovereign authority throughout the world. To study empire is, 
unavoidably, to study this global assertion of sovereignty, not global meta-power.  
 
This emphasis on political power and authority forces us to recognise the incoherent, 
multiple, and often contradictory forms imperial sovereignty assumed and their attendant 
consequences. English and then British idioms of sovereignty were varied and different; there 
was no single British way of claiming territory. The ‘British empire’ was a hodgepodge of 
different lands and societies, all ruled through different forms of government with differing 
claims to political power, with no single set of interests or ideology. The crown provided the 
only possible symbol for the undefinable unity of the empire. But the monarchy simply 
                                                          
1 For a useful overview, see P. Murphy, The Empire's New Clothes: The Myth of the 
Commonwealth (London, 2018), chapters 5 and 8. For Empire and Brexit, see Dorling, D. A. 
and S. A. Tomlinson, Rule Britannia: Brexit and the End of Empire (London, 2019). See 
also, Kennedy, D., 'The Imperial History Wars', Journal of British Studies, 54 (2015), pp. 5-
22. 
The Incoherence of Empire                                                       
3 
This working paper is available under a Creative Commons CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license. See 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ for more detail. 
provided an undefined standard around which different claims to sovereignty could muster.2  
The plural life of imperial sovereignty meant ‘the empire’ could never be a single power, 
space, or set of networks; it was not even a single ‘project’.3  
 
The plurality of claims to sovereignty made within the British empire were not merely a by-
product of the ad hoc process of acquisition or a marker of the diversity of the peoples British 
rule was extended over. They defined the very essence of Britain’s empire, as different 
idioms (anatomised below) emerged in contrast and opposition to one another. Specific to 
only one time and place, each one of the multiple idioms of imperial sovereignty nonetheless 
purported to speak about empire as if it was a single entity, claiming that their logic was the 
sole justification for any kind of imperial power. More than anything else, the British empire 
was defined by a series of mutually self-contradictory ideas about what it was. 
 
In order to function, Britain’s empire relied on the demarcation of different rules and 
different political philosophies for different spaces. But permanent separation was 
impossible. Tension between different forms of political authority occurred within the same 
territories from the start. Large-scale crises, especially global wars in the eighteenth and 
twentieth centuries, forced different regions into contact and therefore conflict. Contests over 
sovereignty, inherent in the plural nature of the empire, defined the empire as a political field 
and a historical entity. The history of the British empire ought to involve tracing the 
outworking of the empire’s inherent incoherence, an incoherence never more prominent than at 
the empire’s end. 
 
II 
Few areas of historical enquiry struggle more with their own conceptualisation than British 
imperial history.4 Since the 1950s the field has struggled between a centrifugal tendency to 
                                                          
2 Something never more apparent than at empire’s end. See P. A. Murphy, Monarchy and the 
End of Empire: The House of Windsor, the British Government, and the Post-War 
Commonwealth (Oxford, 2013). 
3 J. Darwin, The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 1830-1970 
(Cambridge, 2009). 
4 C. A. Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914: Global Connections and 
Comparisons (Oxford, 2004), p. Get PP to discussion of theorisation of empire. 
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split into distinct seemingly unconnected parts, a tendency generally treated with concern by 
‘imperial historians’ (and to which we return below), and a countervailing search for a means 
to define a stable and coherent object of study, and hence to still present ‘the British empire’ 
as a single unified force in the world.5  This concern with the coherence of empire has often 
been coupled with an interest in the contemporary relevance of imperial history. To preserve 
the unity and relevance of its study, empire is associated with some far more vague and 
abstract category which is seen to endure into the present day, whether capitalism (in 
different varieties), globalization, modernity or western civilization. Most importantly, the 
history of political institutions has been neglected, because focusing on it would offer too 
much plurality for a holistic form of analysis. Yet with no stable referent, the result is a 
debate in which, at times, moralising replaces rigorous empirical enquiry. 
 
The apotheosis of imperial history’s search for both unity and relevance over the last few 
decades was Niall Ferguson’s television documentary and popular book, Empire: How 
Britain Made the Modern World, broadcast and published in 2003.6 Ostensibly, with its 
concern to draw parallels between the violent assertion of US power and the British empire, 
Ferguson’s account is an effort to put political power at the centre of analysis. But Empire (as 
also Ferguson’s later work) re-iterated arguments taken from cold-war modernisation theory 
that offered an account of the unidirectional creation of free markets and bureaucratic 
institutions on a civilizational scale, in which the place of political power is hard to pin 
down.7  
                                                          
5 G. Martin, 'Was There a British Empire?', Historical Journal, 15 (1972), pp. 562-569; D. K. 
Fieldhouse, 'Can Humpty-Dumpty Be out Back Together Again? Imperial History in the 
1980s'', Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 12 (1984), pp. 9-23; A. Thompson, 
'Is Humpty Dumpty Together Again? Imperial History and the Oxford History of the British 
Empire', Twentieth Century British History, 12 (2001), pp. 511-527. The Oxford History of 
the British Empire, and its companion series, while seemingly presenting a coherent field in 
fact presented sequential and weakly connected thematic and area specific essays. See W. R. 
Louis ed., Oxford History of the British Empire, 5 vols. (Oxford, 1999).  
6 N. Ferguson, Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World (London, 2003). 
7 W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge, 
1960); M. Connelly, 'Taking Off the Cold War Lens: Visions of North-South Conflict During 
the Algerian War for Independence', American Historical Review, 105 (2000), pp. 739-769. 
The Incoherence of Empire                                                       
5 
This working paper is available under a Creative Commons CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license. See 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ for more detail. 
 
Ferguson defined his project (to restore ‘balance’ and assert empire was on balance a ‘good 
thing’) against a supposed consensus that the empire existed and was a hence ‘bad thing’.8 He 
seemingly had in mind post-Marxist arguments that empire (or rather a nebulous ‘world 
system’) promoted not modernisation through promoting engagement with global trade but 
exploitation and ‘under-development’ in Latin America, Africa, and Asia by the domination 
of these countries by a European/North American core.9 This literature asserted the coherence 
of empire by rejecting much Marxist thought on the centrality of modes of local production 
(as opposed to modes of global exchange) in shaping history through class struggle.10 The 
nature of global power was defined every bit as vaguely in Dependency and World Systems 
Theory as it is in Ferguson’s Empire.  Indeed Empire is little more than an assertion of the 
virtue of global power as described and criticised by much supposedly Marxist writing on 
‘Empire’.11 
  
Before September 11 2001 brought the state back into to the centre of analysis, a generation 
of scholarship marginalized global political economy and instead asserted the coherence of 
empire through culture. For example, Edward Said and historians writing in his wake 
associated empire with a broader cultural domination propagated by non-state actors (in 
Said’s case particularly universities and research institutions) loosely attached to the actions 
                                                          
8 The balance sheet approach reminiscent of a faux exam question in 1066 and All That has a 
siren-like effect on the field.  
9 W. Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (Washington, 1981); A. G. Frank, 
Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America. Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil 
(New York & London, 1969); I. M. Wallerstein, The Modern World-System, 3 Vols. 
(London, 1974-1989); S. Amin, and B. Pearce, Accumulation on a World Scale: A Critique of 
the Theory of Underdevelopment (New York ; London, 1974). 
10 For an incisive overview, see A. Brewer, Marxist Theories of Imperialism: A Critical 
Survey (London, 1990). See also R. Brenner, 'The Origins of Capitalist Development: A 
Critique of Neo-Smithian Marxism', New Left Review, 104 (1977). 
11 For the apotheosis of sinister vagueness, see, M. Hardt and A. Negri, Empire (Cambridge, 
Mass.; London, 2000), which strangely transplants the term empire into the post-
decolonisation world. 
The Incoherence of Empire                                                       
6 
This working paper is available under a Creative Commons CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license. See 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ for more detail. 
of an imperial regime.12 Anthropologists such as Jean and John Comaroff saw imperialism as 
a process of asserting the cultural ‘hegemony’ of the ideologies of European capitalism, 
undertaken by missionary institutions more than by soldiers and officials.13 Similarly, the 
‘new imperial history’ emphasized the place of cultural categories defined through empire, 
particularly race and gender, in metropolitan life, again focusing on non-governmental 
institutions: private networks, public scholarly associations, universities, research centres, 
churches, clubs, missionary societies and so on. These different strands of argument corralled 
empire into a unified, coherent field that was focused on ideas of racial otherness with little 
or passing reference to political forms.14 In imperial studies the cultural turn’s strange neglect 
of political culture left the proposed object of study (empire) without tangible definition even 
though it was not entirely displaced by something else. Empire appeared as a series of 
representations with no plausible account of the political institutions able to enforce them. 
 
The ‘cultural turn’ in imperial history rejected a British ‘liberal’ tradition of imperial history 
supposedly narrowly concerned purely with political power.15 To be sure power (in a diffuse 
sense) was a central concern in this literature. But a careful reading shows that imperial 
historians from the mid-twentieth century onwards, where they sought to generalise, also 
tended to disregard the study of political institutions in detail, replacing a consideration of 
these with a meta-debate (with the Marxists and post-Marxists) about the relationship 
between capitalism and imperialism, the latter category  used vaguely to cover a large swathe 
of British international relations in the extra-European world.16   
 
                                                          
12 E. W. Said, Orientalism (London, 1978); E. W. Said, Culture and Imperialism (London, 
1993).  
13 J. Comaroff and J. L. Comaroff, Of Revelation and Revolution: Christianity, Colonialism, 
and Consciousness in South Africa (Chicago, 1991). 
14 K. Wilson (ed), A New Imperial History: Culture, Identity, and Modernity in Britain and 
the Empire, 1660-1840 (Cambridge, 2004). 
15 D. Kennedy, 'Imperial History and Post-Colonial Theory', Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History, 24 (1996). 
16 A. Dilley, 'Capitalism and Imperialism', in J. M. MacKenzie and N. Dalziel, eds., 
Encyclopedia of Empire (New York, 2016). 
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A close reading of the field’s foundational text, Gallagher and Robinson’s ‘Imperialism of 
Free Trade’ highlights the point. Their article initially defined their project against earlier 
imperial histories which approached empire through the ‘racial and legalistic concept which 
inspired the imperial federation movement’.17 They were, rightly, sceptical of the coherence 
supposedly imparted to empire in such political and institutional accounts. But rather than (as 
we shall) exploring the contradictions which sovereignty necessarily entailed, they rejected 
the category of the political entirely and redefined empire with a much looser conception 
incorporating all forms of power short of annexation. In order to save the unity of their 
subject matter, Robinson and Gallagher asserted that  so-called ‘informal’ and ‘formal’ 
empire were interchangeable sub-categories of a larger and broader process, ‘imperialism’, 
defined as the ‘sufficient political function of … integrating new regions into the expanding 
economy’. Imperial history only had coherence with reference to the history of what has now 
come to be called globalisation. Yet as many scholars have subsequently challenged, the 
result was an account which offered no concrete account of the mechanism by which British 
power was asserted.18 
 
Their successors, Cain and Hopkins, in their gargantuan study, British Imperialism (not 
empire) took this approach to its logical conclusion. For all the differences of interpretation, 
Cain and Hopkins essentially distilled Robinson and Gallagher’s definition of imperialism, 
merely changing the particular inflection of their antecedents’ economistic analysis. 
Sovereignty features in their account as follows: ‘[t]he distinguishing feature of imperialism 
is not that it takes a specific economic, cultural or political form but that it involves an 
incursion, or an attempted incursion, into the sovereignty of another state’.19 ‘Sovereignty’ 
here is something only violated by imperialism not integral to its operation, something 
sacrificed in any power imbalance vaguely discernible to a historian rather than a positive 
entity embedded in tangible political institutions. 
   
                                                          
17 J. Gallagher and R. Robinson, 'The Imperialism of Free Trade', Economic History Review, 6 
(1953), pp. 1-15 at pp. 1-2. 
18 Ibid. 
19 P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, British Imperialism, 1688-2000 (Harlow, 2001), p. 54. 
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John Darwin’s recent trilogy on empire offers the latest product of the Gallagher and 
Robinson tradition, and offers some of its most nuanced and persuasive arguments.20 His 
emphasis on the incomplete nature of empire is helpful in challenging the tendency to treat 
empire as a unidirectional meta-phenomenon.21 Yet just like his predecessors, Darwin creates 
a coherent entity by diminishing the importance of political institutions. The Empire Project 
is concerned with the rise and demise of a diffuse ‘world system’ geared towards a nebulous 
kind geopolitical supremacy. Darwin’s earlier analysis of the pluralism of sovereign imperial 
institutions is suppressed by their location within a nebulous total ‘system’ of global British 
power.22 
 
The main varieties of imperial history written since 1953 have not been analyses of empire at 
all. Diffuse and hard to define forms of global power have remained the true subjects of 
analysis. On a charitable reading, the Robinson and Gallagher tradition might best be 
understood as a global history of the conditions in which empire might arise, not of empire 
itself.23 Yet at the same time, the result has been a kind of nominalism which suggests 
contemporary concepts of ‘empire’ did not create a subject worthy of study, and that the 
categories through which people experienced their lives need to be rejected in favour of one 
or another arbitrary definitions invented by scholars. In the founding text of modern imperial 
history, Gallagher and Robinson made this precise point. ‘The imperial historian’, they say, 
‘is very much at the mercy of his particular concept of empire’. ‘[H]e [sic] decides what facts 
are of ‘imperial’ significance’. Yet Gallagher and Robinson offered little justification for 
                                                          
20 J. Darwin, After Tamerlane: The Global History of Empire since 1405 (London, 2007); J. 
Darwin, The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 1830-1970 
(Cambridge, 2009); J. Darwin, Unfinished Empire: The Global Expansion of Britain (London, 
2012). 
21 Darwin, Empire Project. 
22 J. Darwin, 'A Third British Empire? The Dominion Idea in Imperial Politics', in J. M. 
Brown and W. R. Louis, eds., Oxford History of the British Empire: The Twentieth Century 
(Oxford, 1999). 
23 Best displayed in continuing concern to explain the partition of Africa, see R. Robinson, J. 
Gallagher and A. Denny, Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism 
(London, 1961); J. Darwin, 'Imperialism and the Victorians: The Dynamics of Territorial 
Expansion', English Historical Review, 112 (1997), pp. 614-642. 
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their particular version of the imperial truth other than their own unassailable intellectual 
confidence.24  
 
Robinson and Gallagher’s intellectual nihilism was unnecessary and avoidable. ‘Empire’ was 
a term present in the language of contemporary historical actors, both European and non-
European, and thus in the archival record.25 It referred to finite (if multiple) sets of real claims 
and practices, concerned not primarily with cultural and economic dominance but assertions 
of sovereignty and hence political authority. Naturally as a result, sovereignty and law have 
never been entirely absent from the more detailed literature which has remained in closer 
touch with contemporary archives and rhetoric. Historians of decolonisation for instance 
study a subject framed by transfers of sovereignty, notwithstanding a persistent tendency to 
seek to move beyond such ‘narrow’ definitions.26  There has, more recently, been a growing 
attention to the role of law in the history of empire, which necessarily emphasises empire’s 
lack of coherence. Lauren Benton’s work in particular prefigures elements of our argument 
by highlighting the role of plural forms of law in the making of empire and the global matrix 
of institutions within which empire operated. Crucially, she has recognised that ‘multisided 
legal contests were simultaneously central to the construction of colonial rule and key to the 
formation of larger patterns of global structuring. Precisely because imperial and colonial 
polities contained multiple legal systems, the location of political authority was not uniform 
across the international system’.27 
                                                          
24 Gallagher and Robinson, 'The Imperialism of Free Trade',  at p. 1. 
25 Occurring for example in 371 separate parliamentary papers that have ‘India’ in the title 
between 1860 and 1900, or in 136 which have ‘British North America’ or ‘Canada’ in their 
title between 1860 and 1940. 
26 J. Darwin, 'Decolonization and the End of Empire', in R. W. Winks, ed., Oxford History of 
the British Empire: Historiography (Oxford, 1999), pp. 541-557; A. G. Hopkins, 'Rethinking 
Decolonization', Past & Present, 200 (2008), pp. 211-247. 
 
 
27 L. A. Benton, Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in World History, 1400-1900 
(Cambridge, 2002), p. 3. See also L. A. Benton, A Search for Sovereignty : Law and 
Geography in European Empires, 1400-1900 (Cambridge, 2009); Z. Laidlaw, 'Breaking 
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The real problem has been that the most influential arguments about empire at more than a 
micro-scale try to make coherent claims about global power while continuing to associate 
those claims with the British empire as an historical entity defined by sovereignty. The 
revival of interest in law and sovereignty has not yet ugirded the conceptual foundations of 
imperial meta-histories. Drawing on the work of Benton and others, we here re-assert the 
centrality of sovereignty in conceptualising the field. Sovereignty and power are not 
unconnected, but they are not the same thing. The assertion of empire is not merely a 
synonym for the assertion of power but is something worthy of study in its own right. 
 
IV 
Sovereignty is a concept which has long perplexed both historians and political philosophers 
leading many to reject it entirely, not least those during the last few decades who have argued 
it has no relevance to the history of empire. Yet despite confusion, it has never disappeared, 
for the simple reason that sovereignty is the most important way people discuss the final and 
ultimate form of legitimate power. 
 
Perplexity about sovereignty occurs for two sets of reasons. First, sovereignty involves a set 
of ideological claims about who or what legitimately possesses authority; but it also requires 
really-existing institutions to, more or less, give those claims some kind of practical basis. It 
is, to use the language of political philosophy, both normative and factual; indeed its purpose 
is to mediate between the two. Effective force on its own is not sovereignty; gangsters are not 
kings. But a legitimate claim on its own is not sovereign power; neither the king in exile, nor 
the nationalist party in waiting is sovereign until they are able to control the institutions of 
administration.  
 
Secondly, sovereignty makes claims to both internal and external validation which can be 
very different from one another. European powers recognised their sovereignty over each 
others’ empires, as if each piece of imperial territory was a similar kind of entity. But the 
claims to legitimacy made within each particular territory might be very different. Externally 
recognised imperial sovereignty often co-existed with the limited assertion of power on the 
                                                          
Britannia's Bounds? Law, Settlers, and Space in Britains Imperial Historiogrpahy ', Historical 
Journal, 55 (2012), pp. 807-830. 
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ground; sometimes involving little more than ambiguous agreements with local political 
hierarchies. The form of empire at any one moment was shaped by the complex and highly 
variable way claims to sovereignty were made and practiced.  
 
Common to all claims to imperial sovereignty is a compelling (however compulsion is 
obtained) claim about who or what possesses ultimate authority. As the mid twentieth-
century historian of international relations F.H. Hinsley put it, the claim to sovereignty is 
made by offering a ‘restatement of the permanent problem of deciding the basis of 
government and obligation within a political community’; of determining with whom the 
‘buck stops’ to quote the famous sign on President Truman’s desk.28  
 
Michael Freeden points out that these claims to ultimate authority are usually made in time.29  
Arguments about who possesses final authority rely on stories about how that authority was 
first created: the ‘last instance’ is a moment when authority reverts back to its starting point. 
The disparate territories of the British empire shared their common submission before the 
crown, but they articulated very different stories about how the authority of the crown was 
created in each case. The result of these different historical claims was that the configuration 
and location of authority within the political community were configured in radically 
different ways in different territories. These historical and contemporary claims were so 
different, in fact, they were incapable of being thought about together. 
 
The territories which composed the British empire went under a bewildering variety of 
names: dominions, colonies, protectorates, condominiums, mandates, dependencies, treaty 
ports, territories and the like.30 The language used to describe the relationship between 
Britain and its imperial territories matters, because it expressed the plural forms in which 
British sovereignty was expressed, and sovereignty was the only force that bound imperial 
                                                          
28 F.H. Hinsley, Sovereignty (2nd edition, Cambridge, 1986), p. 26 
29 Michael Freeden, The Political Theory of Political Thinking. The Anatomy of a Practice 
(London, 2013), pp. 119-122 
30 J. Darwin, 'Britain's Empires', in S. E. Stockwell, ed., The British Empire: Themes and 
Perspectives (Oxford, 2008); M. I.Finley, 'Colonies: An Attempt at a Typology', Transactions 
of the Royal Historical Society, 26 (1976), pp. 167-188. 
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territories together. These concepts of sovereignty emerged from but also shaped institutions 
and practices of governance.  
 
The basis for our analysis is therefore a typology of the British empire’s different claims to 
sovereignty, each of which was made in different kinds of story about how authority was 
acquired. This is not to reproduce the reductionist meta-geographies or meta-chronologies 
often used to impart false coherence to the history of empire:  settler/self-governing vs 
dependent/despotic; first, second, third, (even!) fourth British empires. Rather it is to describe 
the different main and competing forms claims of sovereignty could take. Within any location 
they almost always co-existed, shifted and clashed, with no one form inevitably gaining 
dominance. And there is no coherent framework for determining which apply when and 
where. 
 
The starting point within our typology needs to be the early modern English crown’s claim to 
imperial authority over the independent, unitary realm of England itself. Most famously 
articulated in Henry VIII’s Act in Restraint of Appeals (24 Henr. VIII c.12), the claim to 
empire had made from the late fourteenth century onwards, when English alongside other 
European kings began to wear the ‘closed’ crown in the style associated with the Holy 
Roman Emperor. Used to argue that they possessed a similar status as other European 
monarchies, England’s imperial statutes gave its monarch ultimate authority, in the process 
too defining a territorially-defined political community, ‘a body compact of all sorts and 
degrees of people’ which had a duty to obey the crown. In this idiom, the claim of unitary 
absolute monarchical authority relied on no single founding moment, but appealed to a 
history of continuous kingship, citing ‘divers sundry old authentic histories and chronicles’ to 
prove the continuity of English kingship well before the Norman conquest.31 
 
A second rival claim, particularly popular during Britain’s civil wars, founded sovereignty on 
the will of a people, and then made the crown’s authority conditional on the monarch’s 
conformity to popular wishes. Here the people existed as an organised, territorially-defined 
entity that gave the crown its authority, but constituted the first and final arbiter of political 
                                                          
31 David Armitage, The Ideological Origins of the British Empire (Cambridge, 2004), p.34; 
David Armitage, ‘The Elizabethan Idea of Empire’, in Transactions of the Royal Historical 
Society 14 (2004), pp.269-277. 
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decision-making. Like the Henrician monarch, this republican, self-governing people claimed 
a continuous existence before memory or written record, with the Norman conquest 
sometimes seen as an illegitimate usurpation.32.  
 
The invocation of an imperial monarch or imperial people were initially claims to English, 
(or later British sovereignty) over the people in England, and later the United Kingdom. But 
both forms of sovereignty were transferred outside Europe, through conquest, settlement and 
often unequal acts of voluntary cession. These claims justified the attempt to assert 
domination, often through violence, of people and territories throughout the world. But they 
did so in different and mutually incompatible ways, which created very different relationships 
with local and migrant populations, and between overseas territories and the imperial 
metropolis.  
 
Conquest, our third archetype, is often neglected as a source of sovereign political authority; 
some scholars argue indeed that it needed to be ‘masked’ by other principles of legitimacy. 
But the violent subjugation of local states and peoples was an important principle which 
Europeans used to justify the establishment of sovereignty in non-European societies, most 
importantly the Spanish in America and the British in India, until at least the early twentieth 
century.33 As the United States Supreme Court acknowledged in 1832, ‘power, war, 
conquest, give rights, which, after possession, are conceded by the world’. Sovereignty 
erected through conquest relied on a story about an originary conflict and a moment of defeat 
and submission in which authority was transferred to a new state. The consequences were 
complex and ambivalent. Sometimes, conquest annihilated all prior political forms and to 
introduce the law of conqueror unconditionally. Otherwise, the customs or laws of the 
defeated were supposed to be recognised. The point worth emphasizing is that British 
political actors from Ireland to India saw conquest as an act which created rights. During the 
                                                          
32 Lorenzo Sabbadini, ‘Popular sovereignty and representation in the English Civil War’ in 
Bourke and Skinner, pp.164-186.  
33 For example, Mark Wilks, Historical Sketches of the South of India (1820), I, 438-442; 
William, H. Prescott, History of the Conquest of Mexico (London, 1843), II, 43. For conquest 
in East Africa, see J. Lonsdale and B. Berman, Unhappy Valley. Conflict in Kenya and Africa 
(1995), pp.13-44. 
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eighteenth century the nature and consequences of Ireland’s conquest was debated. British 
administrators in India too debated the particular rights which conquest gave them, from the 
early nineteenth century declaring to many local populations that territory had been 
conquered by the British government.34 
 
If conquest was the extra-territorial equivalent of monarchical absolutism, our fourth 
archetype, settlement, once called colonization, was the extra-territorial equivalent of popular 
sovereignty. Conquest relied on a prior political hierarchy which could submit. Settlement 
depended on the settlers’ denial of the existence of prior, legally-constituted political 
authority. That denial relied either on the fiction of terra nullius, empty land, or that land ‘not 
possessed of any Christian Prince’ had no legitimate regime upon it. In practice, settlement 
depended on the eviction or annihilation of existing people. This meant the sequence by 
which contemporaries described the emergence of sovereignty through settlementin histories 
of empire was often complex. The early twentieth century Cambridge History of the 
Australasian Colonies described British sovereignty in North America as not being acquired 
‘by accident of dynastic title’ but through the migration of ‘communities of kindred blood’. 
But sovereignty in New South Wales began with military power, but was transferred to a 
migrant population as free, non-convict settlers moved in greater numbers. This form of 
sovereignty involved ‘a movement of population and an extension of political power’, as an 
early twentieth century textbook put it.35 Settlers constituted themselves as distant citizens of 
the imperial homeland. They then tended to define their citizenship through their racial 
difference from ‘local’ populations, and their common labour in the creation of a settler 
society.36 
 
                                                          
34 Sharon Korman, The Right of Conquest (Oxford, 2003), p.46. Jacqueline Hill, ‘The Language 
and Symbolism of Conquest in Ireland, c.1790-1850’, Transactions of the Royal Historical 
Society 18 (2008), pp.165-86; for example ‘Proclamation of Mountstuart Elphinstone to the 
Landholders of the Deccan on its Conquest’, 11 Feb 1818, Parliamentary Papers HC 1857-8, 
vol.43, p.85 
35 Edward Jenks, A History of the Australasian Colonies (1912); Albert Kenner, Colonization 
(1908), p.1 
36 L. Veracini, '‘Settler Colonialism’: Career of a Concept', The Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History, 41 (2013), pp. 313-333.  
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A fifth category, plantation colonies, involved the establishment of sovereign institutions 
which mobilised the labour of non-citizens, initially indentured labourers, then slaves and 
finally wage labourers to produce specific commodities. Here, a tiny European population 
often imagined themselves to be the members of a self-governing demos. But their 
importation of labouring subjects, through different forms of compulsion, shaped their 
relationship with the rest of the world. In many instances, sovereignty was asserted through 
the legal definition of the subordinated population, through slave codes and penal laws.37 
While this form reached a sine qua non in the Caribbean basin, variants on such differential  
claims to sovereignty made by European settlers on non-Europeans could be found in various 
forms across the empire, for instance in the settler societies of British Africa.  
 
These three categories (conquest, settlement, and plantation) all could run counter to a sixth 
archetype which, in various incarnations, often underlay the story about empire which the 
British often told themselves: that imperial sovereignty was justified in the supposed 
advances and benefits delivered to those governed. Whether under the guise of the ‘civilising 
mission’ or concepts of ‘trusteeship’, this strand of underlying paternalism persisted in 
British discourses on Empire. Trusteeship underpinned Edmund Burke’s arguments on India 
in the 1780s, along with anti-slavery and nineteenth century humanitarianism. It was a central 
element of Lord Lugard’s ‘Dual Mandate’ and underpinned clashes between Southern 
Rhodesian and Kenyan settlers and the colonial office. The racialized justifications for 
colonial rule often combined claims about its supposedly beneficent effects and its necessity 
given the supposed incapacity of subjects to govern themselves. In modified form such 
arguments justified the withholding of full autonomy from either imperial governors or 
impatient settlers. This form also transferred directly into the League of Nations mandate 
system.38 
                                                          
37 For the importance of slave codes in Jamaica, see Mary Turner, Slaves and Missionaries. 
The Disintegration of Jamaica Slave Society, 1787-1834 (London, 1982); for Ireland as a 
plantation society ruled through a penal code, Ian McBride, Eighteenth Century Ireland. The 
Isle of Slaves (Dublin, 2009), chapter 5. 
38 R. Hyam, 'Bureacracy and 'Trusteeship' in Colonial Rule', in J. M. Brown and W. R. Louis, 
eds., Oxford History of the British Empire, Vol.4: The Twentieth Century (Oxford, 1999); A. 
N. Porter, 'Trusteeship, Anti-Slavery and Humanitarianism', in A. N. Porter, ed., Oxford 
History of the British Empire: Vol 3 :The Nineteenth Century (Oxford, 1999); F. J. D. B. 
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Seventh, sovereignty was acquired through the (formal) voluntary cession of authority 
through treaties with existing regimes. Often this supposedly consensual act of cession 
occurred after a moment of violence; frequently the terms of exchange were unequal. But the 
claim that rights had been ceded rather than seized shaped the history of later institutions, 
enabling subordinated populations to article their own claims with a language of historical 
legitimacy. The capitulations, unequal treaties, and other partial concessions of sovereignty 
which characterised Britain’s imperial presence in the Ottoman Empire and China might be 
understood as a confined blend of conquest and treaty-based sovereign authority where the 
nature of British claims were deeply contested.39 In practice, cession involved a creative 
blend of old and new, and the reconstruction and co-option of existing or (re)invented 
sovereignties into imperial structures. Much of Britain’s African, Asian, and Middle Eastern 
Empire was governed in this way.40 
 
Eighth and finally, sovereignty over a territory could be founded on the authority of global 
institutions. The most obvious examples are the League of Nations and United Nations 
mandates of the early twentieth-century; but joint and complicatedly interwoven forms of 
authority were common beforehand, from international supervision of the sixteenth-century 
fisheries at Newfoundland to the treaty ports in nineteenth-century China. Trans-national 
claims to sovereignty often involved a more abstract and universalistic language and created 
institutions which followed suit.41 Thus the municipal council which administered the 
international settlement in Shanghai, while incorporating many forms familiar from 
elsewhere in the British empire, functioned as a vehicle for what Isabella Jackson calls ‘trans-
                                                          
Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa (London, 1922); P. J. Cain, 'Character, 
‘Ordered Liberty’, and the Mission to Civilise: British Moral Justification of Empire, 1870–
1914', Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 40 (2012), pp. 557-578. 
39 Jurgen Osterhammel, 'Semi-Colonialism and Informal Empire in Twentieth-Century 
China: Towards a Framework of Analysis ' in Mommsen, W. J. and J. Osterhammel eds., 
Imperialism and After: Continuities and Discontinuities, (London, 1986), pp. 290-314. 
40 For the resultant muddle in Africa, see W. M. Hailey, An African Survey: A Study of 
Problems Arising in Africa South of the Sahara (Oxford, 1938). 
41 Michael D. Callahan, The League of Nations and Africa, 1914-1931 (Eastbourne, 2008); S. 
Pedersen, The Guardians : The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire (Oxford, 2016). 
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national colonialism’ administered by a multinational cast of actors within the matrix 
established by foundational treaties and concessions by China.42 Equally a shifting legal and 
ideological framework shaped ideas of legitimate global power. Wilsonian self-determination 
connected claims of popular sovereignty to international legitimacy.43 One aspect of the 
history of decolonization is the progressive de-legitimisation of many of the alternative 
claims to sovereignty practiced by European empires, to which a growing literature on the 
UN and decolonization bears testimony.44 
 
This list of archetypes must not be considered exhaustive or mutually exclusive. There are no 
stable boundaries between each one; each can be sub-divided. Nor is each intended to define 
the identity of any single area of imperial territory. Within any one place and time, a single 
set of claims sometimes predominated. More commonly, more than one claim was made at a 
single point in time, sometimes in coalescence and sometimes competition with others. The 
relationship between claims to sovereign authority and the institutions which asserted power 
in practice were complex. A single set of institutions could generate very different claims to 
sovereignty. Equally, multiple claims were made by different people to discuss a single set of 
institutions in the same place. A major driver of political life within any one territory was the 
contestation of one particular claim to sovereignty, and the effort to replace it with another 
which would require institutions of administration to work in a different way. Thus 
sovereignty connected intimately to all aspects of government – the realities and 
repercussions as well as the theories of legitimate authority. 
 
                                                          
42 I. Jackson, Shaping Modern Shanghai: Colonialism in China's Global City (Cambridge, 
2018); R. Bickers and I. Jackson eds., Treaty Ports in Modern China (London, 2016). 
43 E. Manela, 'Imagining Woodrow Wilson in Asia: Dreams of East-West Harmony and the 
Revolt against Empire in 1919', American Historical Review, 111 (2006), pp. 1327-1351; E. 
Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of 
Anticolonial Nationalism (Oxford, 2007). 
44J. L. Pearson, 'Defending Empire at the United Nations: The Politics of International 
Colonial Oversight in the Era of Decolonisation', The Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History, 45 (2017), pp. 525-549; M. Mazower, No Enchanted Palace: The 
End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations (Oxford, 2009); R. Burke, 
Decolonization and the Evolution of International Human Rights (Philadelphia, 2010). 
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V 
 
The empire’s sweep encouraged its protagonists and subjects to try to tell a universal story 
about its rise, systematic character and then, most recently, its fall. As we’ve shown, since the 
1950s, where such attempts are made, empire has only been able to be presented by scholars 
as a unitary system or project because it has been turned into the representation of something 
else, which, as imperial institutions collapsed couldn’t be compared to the complexity of 
really-existing practice. But from the seventeenth to mid-twentieth century, debates between 
the claims made between different forms of sovereign authority asserted in different places in 
pan-imperial conversations failed, ever, to create a consensus about what the empire was. 
During the existence of Britain’s worldwide empire itself, the contradictory claims its 
protagonists and subjects made about the nature of imperial authority in any time and place 
meant a single coherent story was never (and is not) possible. We can see this particularly by 
mapping some of the main divergences and convulsions caused by the interactions of 
different imperial sovereignties. In so doing it becomes clear that the disruptive force that one 
claim to sovereignty had upon others was a powerful force shaping the history of empire.  
 
In particular, empire achieved its greatest semblance of coherence, the greatest sense of co-
ordinated action with a defined purpose, during times of global war. Yet the short term 
exigencies and exertions required to create such coherent action only fuelled the disruptive 
tendencies of multiple idioms of sovereign authority. Such periods coincided with major 
assertions, reconfigurations, and retreats from imperial authority. Conversely, the most 
seemingly ‘stable’ periods of imperial history coincided with the isolation of the empire’s 
various combustible elements from one another, with the highest levels of incoherence.   
 
The earliest assertion of England’s extra-European political authority were bound up with 
trade. But the relationship between trade and sovereignty was complex and contested. 
Sporadic efforts by English merchants to profit from growing world-wide trading networks in 
the sixteenth century did not receive significant royal backing. During the early seventeenth-
century, from Virginia to South East Asia, merchants and adventurers used ostensibly similar 
organisations to provide political support for extra-European trade and settlement, most 
commonly the chartered corporation. But the weak support such nominally royal institutions 
gained from the monarchy itself allowed them to take on a range of very different practical 
forms, making different claims about the basis of their authority in each case. By the act of 
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Union in 1707, the new ‘British’ state already possessed an incoherent conglomeration of 
overseas territories, all ruled under some form of royal charter, but whose claims about 
extending the crown’s authority were variously made in the name of settlement, treaty and 
conquest. 
 
South Asia and the Americas are traditionally seen as representing two different phases of 
British imperial expansion. Yet claims to sovereignty were made in both at the same time, 
and both spheres saw competition between a similar set of sovereign idioms. In India, the 
East India Company was an agency of English sovereignty from the start, ruling a series of 
territories on behalf of the English crown from the 1660s. The Company claimed its first 
territories, the cities of Madras and Bombay, by treaty. The right of conquest was first 
invoked in the 1680s, when the Company attempted unsuccessfully to capture new port cities. 
Sovereignty never straightforwardly followed commerce; there was no necessary political 
relationship, informal or formal, between economic ‘expansion’ and imperial authority. 
Throughout Britain’s history in India there were European merchants who claimed their 
commercial interests could be better satisfied without monopolies, companies and military 
force: trade could have existed without empire, in other words. As in the Americas too, 
empire was usually an attempt to control, discipline and regulate otherwise unruly Britons 
overseas.45 
 
The East India Company established a pan-subcontinental regime through a combination of 
war and cession from the late eighteenth-century. Throughout the nineteenth-century, 
conquest, and a narrative about the supposed weakness of preceding Indian forms of power, 
provided the official ideology for British rule. But even into the 1820s, this conquest story 
was challenged by an alternative, minor idiom which based British sovereignty on the 
settlement of a small English population who brought with them English law and 
constitutional principles; some even arguing those principles should apply to non-Europeans. 
The rhetoric of liberal imperialism formulated by Thomas Macaulay in the 1830s was a way 
to reconcile the otherwise mutually disruptive claims made by those discussing British 
sovereignty either in terms of conquest or the spread of British institutions through 
                                                          
45 Philip J. Stern, The Company State. Corporate Sovereignty and the Early Modern 
Foundations of the British Empire in India (Oxford, 2011); Jon Wilson, India Conquered. 
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settlement. It did so by claiming that different forms of government applied to people at 
different stages of civilisation. Liberal imperialism was a way of justifying an otherwise 
incoherent political situation in Britain, validating the fact that conquest had already created 
sovereign authority in India to a public who increasingly understood their only polity with 
very different idioms.46 
 
The assertion of English authority in the Americas first involved a set of multiple, 
contradictory claims too. The crown’s authority was shipped across the Atlantic through 
mechanisms which transferred institutions through the transportation of a performative text. 
But from early on it was possible for settlers to assert that their collective will as subjects of 
the Crown allowed them to create new English institutions. The Mayflower Compact, signed 
by 41 men on the brink of settlement at Cape Cod in 1620, famously created a new ‘civil 
body politic’ to govern the new colony. The act was deemed necessary, as the Mayflower had 
sailed beyond the geographical limits which the London Virginia Company, whose territory 
the ship was originally sailing to, had been assigned by its charter. In creating their own new 
corporate entity, the settlers claimed that the authority of ‘our dread sovereign Lord, King 
James’ transferred within their bodies as individual subjects, not only in previously agreed 
structures which emanated from England. Other institutions based their assertion of royal 
authority in the Americas on very different claims. 
 
The events leading up to the independence of Britain’s thirteen American colonies showed 
how global war exposed the tensions between different claims to sovereignty. The effort by 
the British state to create a world-wide fighting force during the Seven Years War turned 
incompatible claims to sovereignty into mutually disruptive forms of authority.47 War with 
France saw unprecedented military and financial exertions by the British state and its allies 
                                                          
46 Haruki Inagaki, ‘The Ruke of Law and Emergency in Colonial India. The Conflict 
Between the King’s Court and the Government in Bombay in the 1820s’, PhD 
Dissertation, King’s College London, 2016; Kieran Hazzard, ‘From Conquest to Consent. 
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and agents in Atlantic, European, and Asian theatres. It also sharpened the claims made by 
some of the American colonies, that royal legitimacy was exercised through institutions 
based on the consent of settlers.48 After 1763 Westminster acted with a new conception of 
itself as an imperial parliament.49 Against these claims, colonists used a range of different 
rival conceptions of sovereignty, defending the role of popular sovereignty and the right of 
individual Englishmen to move and create their own new collective institutions; but also re-
asserting a pre-1707 conception of empire as a multiple monarchy in which each element had 
autonomy in negotiating its relationship with the crown. It was, in short, the short-lived 
attempt to govern Britain’s Atlantic empire as a coherent whole which provoked the 
breakdown of imperial governance in the thirteen colonies.  
 
Ironically, by the 1850s the remainder of the settler empire came far closer to eighteenth 
century colonial rather than metropolitan concepts of governance. This was not inevitable. In 
the early nineteenth century in upper and lower Canada politics was characterised by a 
conflict between governors and settler assemblies. This was a clash between the sovereignty 
of the governor-general as representative of the monarch and of Westminster, and the popular 
sovereignty considered inherent in local assemblies; in other words between two rival 
conceptions of imperial sovereignty. The clash was resolved through ‘responsible 
government’, the practice of making the executive ‘responsible’ to the elected majority.50 
Rapidly thereafter, the possibilities of any pan-imperial project run from London diminished. 
At the very height of mid-Victorian free trade ideology, the supposed pinnacle of the 
‘Imperialism of Free Trade’, and on the eve of the 1860 Cobden-Chevalier treaty, in 1859 
Britain conceded that the province of Canada had the right to raise protective tariffs.51 Thus a 
concession of autonomy based on a settler-centric concept of governance overturned any 
commitment to at least this particular ideologically charged element of Britain’s nineteenth 
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(Basingstoke, 1992). 
51 A. A. Den Otter, 'Alexander Galt, the 1859 Tariff and Canadian Economic Nationalism', 
Canadian Historical Review, 58 (1982), pp. 151-178. 
The Incoherence of Empire                                                       
22 
This working paper is available under a Creative Commons CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license. See 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ for more detail. 
century liberal vision of global order. Political liberalism trumped economic liberalism, or 
even any attempt at coherent economic governance. 
 
Before 1857, power in British India was scattered in a complex collection of institutions 
whose authority was traced predominantly from a succession of conquests, interspersed with 
occasional moments of cession. In the East India Company’s port cities there was occasional 
discussion of some form of local self-rule involving Indians as well as Europeans. But 
conflict between the mobile and free-trading ethos in Calcutta, Madras and Bombay, and 
anxious military (or militaristic) governors was endemic. English judges trying to administer 
a globalised version of the common law frequently clashed with East India Company officers 
suppressing revolt and imposing a highly militarised form of bureaucratic rule. Far from 
being Macaulay’s the land of improving reform, “British” India was in fact a patchwork of 
different territories governed according to different laws, idioms and practices of rule; all 
nominally under the sovereignty of the Mughal emperor, but with the militaristic idiom of 
conquest as the dominant language of authority.52 
 
The brutal re-taking of North India after the insurrection of 1857 consolidated conquest as the 
sole idiom used to talk about British authority in India, affirming state violence as the sole 
validating trope for British power. A more homogenous set of legal codes were imposed. 
Railway lines extended. These tools allowed a British administrative hierarchy to extend 
across India for the first time, reliant in many places on the subordinate agency of particular 
groups of elite Indians who made reluctant peace in their public lives, but kept their distance 
in private. The goal of the imperial state was to preserve its ability to militarily dominate 
India, not spread British capitalism or civilization. To do that the British regime tried to 
rigidly define social hierarchies or roles, as, for example in the way it relied on caste and 
ethnic differences to manage the army. Or, it withdrew into its cantonments and residencies, 
limiting its contact with Indians to curt and often mutually unintelligible exchanges in court-
rooms or tax offices. Resistance was met with exemplary violence or, if it didn’t directly 
challenge sovereign power, pull back. The 1911 decision to move British India’s capital to 
Delhi was one such retreat, an attempt to move the locus of British authority away from 
fractious and politicised Calcutta to a dead city, which had been almost entirely depopulated 
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since 1857. These strategies occurred alongside the militaries forms of ceremonial, durbars 
and assemblages, where the monarch’s representation sat on top of a mythical representation 
of the conquered social order, to project an image of stately dominance to both indigenous 
and British society.53 
 
This essentially Tory vision of empire as a multi-hierarchy presided over by an all-
conquering warrior monarch was radically incompatible with the idioms emerging from the 
self-governing settler colonies (dominions from 1907). A cadre of British and dominion-
based late Victorian and Edwardian thinkers devoted enormous attention to the possibilities 
of imperial federation.54 They left their mark particularly through historical writings seeking 
to present empire as an organic whole not primarily, as Robinson and Gallagher supposed, to 
explain an imperial past but rather to shape an imperial future.55 The project itself served to 
highlight the incoherence of the empire as a unit, yet the mutually disruptive sovereignties of 
the empire undermined any possibility of success. Several insurmountable barriers presented 
themselves. One barrier to any serious prospect of imperial federation came from the jealous 
way in which the component states of that empire, Britain as well as the dominions, guarded 
their individual and (in the case of the dominions) growing autonomy and sovereignty.56 As 
Herbert Asquith told the 1911 Imperial Conference, ‘Whether in this United Kingdom or in 
any of the great communities which you represent, we each of us are, and we each of us 
intend to remain, master in our own household’.57 Voluntary co-ordination, embodied in 
Colonial and later Imperial Conferences and ultimately the British Commonwealth of Nations 
as described by the Balfour Declaration and the Statute of Westminster, fell far short of the 
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original vision.58 Federation became loose association, an empire that ‘don’t care what you 
do’.59  
 
The relationship of imperial federation to the empire’s non-European majority also presented 
problems imperfectly acknowledged by federationists themselves. Seeley’s Expansion of 
England did not overlook India entirely, but marginalised it. The Raj became a great 
anomaly, a complex responsibility which, nonetheless, could not be abandoned.60 Seeley 
justified Britain’s presence there by saying that India was not British at all, that Britons 
temporarily governed a separate and coherent civilisation with only limited impact. The 
coherence of empire was protected by denying the concept applied to the empire’s largest 
territory. Similarly, nothing in Seeley’s writings would predict or justify the 
contemporaneous partition of Africa. Caribbean islands too (included by Seeley in Greater 
Britain as the possessor of representative institutions dominated by Europeans) occupied an 
equally paradoxical status. Greater Britain was conceived of as a white space, yet that 
conception ran against the supposedly racially blind subject-hood of imperial citizens.61 But 
Greater Britain could not be disentangled from the broader empire. Asian migration for 
example brought this tension to the fore. The Natal Education test, agreed in 1897, emerged 
as a ‘solution’ which simultaneously claimed to eschew racial (as opposed to ‘educational’) 
restrictions and yet in practice enabled the settler colonies to constrain non-white 
immigration.62 The real intent was transparent. The Komagata Maru incident, where South 
Asian migrants were turned away from British Columbia, fuelled challenges to the Raj and 
illustrated how this attempt to create a ‘white space’ disrupted practices of sovereignty in 
India.63  
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The very incoherence of empire made rationalisation impossible even by dividing between 
several components because it was impossible to do so without generating profound 
repercussions for the remaining sections of the Empire. It was perhaps no surprise that arch-
rationaliser and self-declared ‘British race patriot’ Alfred Milner argued that for ‘any 
principle of Imperial policy’ to be ‘really applicable to one of the great divisions of the 
Empire’ would make it ‘inapplicable to the other’, and suggested that if he was forced to 
choose between the ‘self-governing’ and ‘dependent’ empire, he would choose the first. Yet 
for every couple of Milners there was a George Curzon asserting the centrality of India, 
conquest and hierarchy to the imperial project.64  
 
The British Empire never looked more coherent than during the two World Wars. Both saw 
significant contributions from almost all sections of the Empire (only Eire in the Second 
World War remained neutral, and even then made significant unofficial and semi-official 
contributions to Britain’s war effort). In each war the self-governing dominions made 
disproportionate contributions of men, money, and materials, but in each major contribution 
were exacted from the remainder of the empire with varying levels of compulsion.  
 
The First World War in particular allowed the empire to seem a single unit. The frequent 
visits of dominion premiers to Britain and their admission to the counsels of empire (as well 
as to its diplomatic relations with the allies) all were seen by many to presage a broader form 
of imperial federation. Britain’s abandonment of free trade seemed to open the way to 
imperial preference and a broader programme to govern the empire as an economic unit. 
Meanwhile considerable thought was given to mechanisms to marshal the resources of the 
tropical empire.65  
 
But appearances were deceptive. The co-ordination of the various sovereignties of the empire 
in the First World War disrupted the possibilities of governance in the long term. 
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Conscription debates in Canada and Australia highlighted the limits of the imperial 
contribution in the chief dominions. The Dublin rising of 1916 and 1915 Afrikaner revolt in 
South Africa equally demonstrated the potential for the British connection to be challenged in 
these territories. The result in the 1920s were that significant elements in the dominions 
(including the newly established Irish Free State) were chiefly concerned to assert autonomy 
and sovereignty. The War and its aftermath (not least the abolition of the Ottoman Empire) 
stoked support for an increasingly anti-imperial Congress in South Asia. India’s status 
emerged from the war even more ambiguous.66 Meanwhile, and following more closely the 
Victorian precedents, British interwar governance in Africa never seriously pursued 
developmental projects planned during wartime. Indirect rule reached its heyday in the 1920s 
and 1930s.67  
 
The war also unleashed new external pressures on imperial sovereignty, with the language of 
Wilsonian self-determination empowering those determined to assert national sovereignty.68 
In straightened circumstances, the empire survived, but largely by recreating separate 
relations with its various constituent elements. The dominions (and India and Eire) were 
syphoned into the new British Commonwealth of Nations whose politics were in large part 
characterised by a search for self-definition.69 India was also subjected to oscillating rounds 
of repression and constitutional reform. Much of the rest reverted to indirect rule through a 
night-watchman colonial state: the empire’s constituent parts survived by rejecting the 
wartime moment of coherence and reverting to separation and isolation.70 
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The Second World War repeated the tendencies of the First. All the Dominions except Eire 
joined Britain’s war effort voluntarily (South Africa’s participation was on a knife-edge). 
Elsewhere contributions were exacted with varying balances of coercion and cooperation.71 
In South Asia, India’s forced entry into the war led to widespread resistance. Driven by 
substantial American presence in India after Pearl Harbour and the practical recognition by 
senior military officers that they had a choice between empire or victory, the British 
government practically conceded national autonomy in many spheres of life.72 Even so, 
coercion was extreme at moments of severe political breakdown. Britain’s wartime 
borrowings from India have been compared to a forced loan.73 Development in Tropical 
Africa for the first time became a policy goal backed by significant resources (the second 
Colonial Development and Welfare Act).74 
 
The aftermath of the war saw the persistence of uneven governance across the Empire. In 
South Asia governors and military officers countenanced only re-conquest or flight, and 
choose the latter when it was obvious the former was impossible.75 The ‘old’ dominions 
emerged from the war with independent relationships with the new global power, the United 
States (albeit using the UK as a counterbalance).76 Meanwhile in the remainder of the 
colonial empire the ‘second colonial occupation’ saw a late, relatively brief, but intensely 
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interventionist drive for development, rooted in a short-lived effort to secure and legitimate 
imperial sovereignty. Post-war colonial development was the nearest the empire came to 
having a single project outside wartime, but it was only possible because India and the white 
dominions no longer needed to be integrated into a single imperial concept.77 This last 
attempt to impose a project on the empire only stoked emergent colonial nationalisms. The 
rash of ‘emergencies’ in Kenya, Malaya, Cyprus and Nyasaland revealed a determination to 
maintain the primacy of British imperial power just years before it was to be claimed that its 
obsolescence was planned all along.78   
 
The rapid failure of the second colonial occupation serves to illustrate how much of a 
departure an empire with a coherent project was from the norm.79 In practice, even this late 
project promoted several different forms of empire across Africa in the 1950s (‘multi-racial 
partnership’ and African majoritarian rule), once again illustrating the impossibility of sealing 
multiple sovereignties within any one component of empire.80 Never were the British 
Empire’s mutually disruptive practices of sovereignty more clearly displayed than at empire’s 
fall. 
 
In Britain itself, empire’s incoherence allowed its demise was un-traumatc, in some ways to 
be barely recognised. The existence of multiple sovereignties meant there was not a single 
traumatic juncture, no unitary moment when empire as a whole was in crisis.81 The 
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connections with Britain were wound down piecemeal and, in the case of the all-important 
old dominions almost imperceptibly.82 Even Irish independence had relatively little impact 
beyond Ulster. Ireland’s complete departure from the Commonwealth (and hence the messy 
patchwork of imperial sovereignty) in 1949 went largely unremarked. Race and migration 
became an increasingly charged issue in British society and politics as immigration from the 
‘New Commonwealth’ accelerated. But this is best understood not as a straightforward 
legacy of empire, but through the absence of any effort to create a common, all inclusive, 
conception of imperial citizenship in Britain.83 The most powerful and predictable legacy of 
empire were political formations jealously seeking to secure the sovereignty of the nation 
state, ironically using the same language of independence deployed by opponents of imperial 
power in the colonies in Britain itself.84 
 
VI 
The main contours of British imperial history are better understood as the products of the 
British Empire’s fundamental incoherence and the centrality of sovereignty to the operation 
of empire than as components of a single deeper meta-history. Acquired, governed, and 
disbanded in no preconceived fashion, the empire was composed of discrete and mutually 
disruptive sovereignties. In each sphere distinct practices of governance evolved. Much of the 
challenge, such as it was, of imperial governance lay in separating these sovereignties or 
managing the contradictions inherent between them. Far from a homogenous grand scheme, 
there was no imperial or colonial system, not even a project. The goal of imperial governance 
was the perpetuation of imperial governance.  
 
Different conceptions of sovereignty enabled or constrained different sets of possibilities for 
colonial government. Most obviously, the violence associated with empire did not occur 
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evenly. The level of both endemic and episodic violence varied. An attention to the concepts 
of sovereignty in operation at particular junctures provides suggestive ways to explain this. 
First, the degree to which concepts of sovereignty conceived of populations as objects rather 
than subjects or citizens affected the possibility for violence to be legitimated. Slave 
plantations treated the bulk of the population as property opened the way for extreme levels 
of coercion constrained only by metropolitan regulation.85  Similarly in settler societies, 
endemic violence became concentrated on frontiers of colonialism where indigenous peoples 
were marginalised and displaced.86  
 
The politics within the empire frequently revolved around contests between differing 
conceptions of sovereignty. Political contests and political violence were not solely caused by 
the incoherence of empire. But its incoherence, and the multiple contradictory conceptions of 
sovereignty it contained accentuated the chance of clashes and provided alternative 
vocabularies through which challenges to the status quo might be mobilised. Many of the 
most violent episodes in imperial history occurred as groups of people quickly realised how 
radically different their antagonists’ conception of sovereignty was. Participants in the 1857 
rising in Northern India rallied around Mughal sovereignty in response to British assertions 
of rights of conquest, along with associated attempts to intervene at an all–India level. Here, 
actions seen by British officers as the necessary consequence of sovereignty acquired by 
conquest were illegitimate when viewed through the prism of the East India Company’s 
bounded treaties with Mughal sovereignty.87 The violence of the end of empire emerged from 
competing conceptions of national sovereignty which emerged out of or in response to 
different imperial idioms. The violence associated with the Mau Mau rising in Kenya or 
continual violence in Southern Rhodesia emerged in contexts where imperial, settler, and 
various African notions of sovereignty all clashed. 
 
Equally, attention to the incoherence of empire helps unpick the economic consequences of 
empire. Clashing conceptions of sovereignty produced no institutional coherence. Empire as 
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a whole was not a project of development, nor the systematic producer of underdevelopment, 
although all of these occurred at certain places and times. The economic effects of empire 
were bi-products of particular practices and objectives of governance in particular locations. 
Priorities were heavily depended on which idioms of sovereignty were in operation in a 
territory. Railways, for example, in India were primarily constructed for military and political 
ends, to secure conquest, with British capitalists constantly clamouring for more and different 
routes.88 In reverse, those in much of tropical Africa and Australia prioritised exports, so the 
north-south transcontinental line in Australia which Lord Kitchener recommended in 1909 as 
being integral to the territory’s defence was only completed in 2003. Many colonial territories 
focused heavily on export production, but they did so in different degrees and with different 
effects. Where sovereignty was articulated through the migration of British populations, 
democratic institutions created pressures on politicians to facilitate development which 
benefited the (settler, but not indigenous) population at large. Where authority was articulated 
through other idioms, other interests, which had goals other than the economic development 
of the territory as a whole prevailed. On this reading, underdevelopment was not an inevitable 
product of export orientation but of the particular form of imperial sovereignty practices in a 
territory.89 The most economically successful portions of the empire, the dominions, were 
precisely those portions where economic policy was increasingly determined domestically 
through representative institutions responding in a fluid way to global (and British) economic 
norms.90 Elsewhere, the desire of imperial officers to maintain more absolutist idioms of 
imperial sovereignty created weak and contradictory state forms, fragmented law codes, and 
new internal forms of despotism, usually (if not inevitably) constraining the involvement of 
local populations in institutions which would have facilitated development.91  
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To define the empire as an entity characterised only by the turbulence of clashing concepts of 
sovereignty, and to emphasise the primacy of self-perpetuation does not therefore deny or 
minimise the violence often associated it or the economic repercussions of imperial rule; it 
offers more nuanced ways to understand it. To emphasise incoherence is not, necessarily, to 
favour a minimalist interpretation of the impact of empire. In some cases it explains the 
opposite. The British desire to assert one conception of sovereignty over another offers a far 
more plausible explanation for the often over-whelming nature of imperial force than the 
desire to satisfy economic interests. A concept of sovereignty based on conquest or the 
creation of plantations intrinsically relies on violence, while economic interests were often 
undermined by the frenetic nature of British force. The point to stress is that the impacts and 
practices associated with imperial rule varied considerably in time and space. There was no 
single logic driving the history of empire. 
 
 
VII 
Histories and arguments which conceive the British Empire as a single unit of analysis, 
misconstrue the nature of empire. Those trying to connect empire with other unitary 
categories then perpetuate a double misunderstanding. Instead, the history of the British 
empire was always one in which mutually disruptive sovereignties and a maelstrom of 
political projects clashed, coalesced and contradicted one another. ‘The empire’ was an 
unstable field of difference and contestation, not a unit of common action. Its discrete 
practices of politics curtailed the possibility that the empire, in its century- and globe-
spanning entirety, had clear coherent and unilineal effects.  
 
The argument here is not that the British empire did not exist. Clearly it did, not least in the 
consciousness of its protagonists and critics. Its existence was central in shaping the history 
of the territories it encompassed and over which it exerted sovereignty. Rather it is to argue 
that empire was a concept (or cluster of concepts) which did not reflect a coherent referent; 
and that the history of empire should be approached as an exercise in charting the contests 
between mutually contradicting sovereignties in various locations, and the presence of the 
incoherence of empire as a potentially disruptive force in their histories.92 With its focus on 
unevenness and plurality, such an analysis precludes the association of ‘the British empire’ 
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with an abstract meta-concept such as capitalism, globalization, modernity or Western 
civilization. Hence, it also precludes assertions of empire-wide continuity with the present, 
which in particular fail to acknowledge the degree to which the period of decolonisation saw 
a collapse of the political-institutional forms that was empire. Empire really did end.93 
Reducing the history of empire to a monochrome parable for the present does a profound 
disservice to the past. But it also fails to offer a useful way of understanding the shape of the 
trans-national forces which shape the world we live in today. Far better that historians 
acknowledge the fundamental incoherence of empire, and then develop more sophisticated 
ways of understanding the post-imperial world which followed its collapse on its own terms. 
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